This framing provides ways of situating animalisation in relation to thinking (as well as responsibility, ethics, politics and futurity). Because thinking or thought retains a special privilege in animalized accounts of personhood, self and relation to others, the connections that Agamben makes between thinking and life have special importance. Any shift in thinking about thought or practices of thinking deeply affects experiences of self, body, others and collective life. Since the nineteenth century, large parts of the psy-dsciplines (psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive science) and the life sciences have devoted themselves to that. Gladwell answers that taking 'our instincts seriously' means attending to 'the very smallest components of our everyday lives -the content and origin of those instantaneous impressions and conclusions that spontaneously arise whenever we meet a new person, confront a complex situation or have to make a decision under conditions of stress' (16) . We can 5 take this call to heed our instincts in different ways. For instance, we might regard it as re-affirming biological determinism. However, Gladwell's and other similar books situate biology and animality in everyday senses of self. They highlight everyday scenarious (in the classroom, on the street, in a gallery, at home) and suggest that knowing biological explanations of them changes Rather than concerning themselves with neurophysiology or cognitive psychology as scientific enterprises, these three accounts draw from them practically-oriented ideas about selfhood in everyday life. They look for elements to weave together in 'technologies of self' 4 that can rapidly react, feel, invent, create, intuit and organise itself in networked capitalism. Johnson, like many others, sees brain science as a way of delineating how thinking overflows the discursive, logical, rational, or representational. The connection to brain science affirmed here is not to a classic scientific model, nor to a 6 determinist or reductionist account of self or culture as might be found in contemporary evolutionary psychology. 5 They inculcate a quasi-experimental relation to self by borrowing from specific scientific disciplines and knowledges, combined with television nature documentary style narrative, brain-imaging techniques, therapeutic interventions, dietary and pharmaceutical regimes. Media, technology, everyday life and science intermingle here. Connolly connects the different components in this experimental sensibility when he writes:
Today a dense series of loops and counterloops among cinema, TV, philosophy, neurophysiology, and everyday life enable people to explore the relation between thinking and affect more readily. 6 While the precise character of the 'loops and counterloops' between media, science and 'everyday life' merit more description, here the key problem is to explain how animalization makes these loops feasible.
Animality in everyday action
At one level, Agamben's The Open parallels the popular literature. 7 Accounts such as Johnson's, Gladwell's and Connolly's (although his diverges radically in theory) connect thinking and animality at a practical, quasi-popular level. They combine science and quotidian anecdotes to prove that responses, feelings, intuitions, or various kinds of memory are animal reactions developed to solve problems of survival. Agamben's work also connects thinking to animality.
However, it scales thinking up to a historico-philosophical and political level.
The practical, quasi-popular level understands thinking as something that can be modified, enhanced, and rendered more flexible or adaptable by reference 7 to scientific knowledges of animal behaviour, cognition and neurophysiology. As Nigel Thrift argues, these modifications serve very precise economic functions. 8 Similarly, at the historico-philosophical level of Agamben's account, the machinery that produces, as we will see, the very possibility of any experience of boredom, pleasure, everyday life and thinking hinges on animality.
However, Agamben's differs decisively. It allows us to ask whether the loops between neurophysiology and everyday life, between animality and thinking more broadly, can be smooth or uneventful.
In The Open, Agamben argues that any concept of humanity must both exclude and include animal nature. A logic of exclusion-inclusion drives the history of philosophical, religious, legal, political, scientific and artistic concepts of the human in the West. Departing from an analysis of political sovereignity developed in Homo Sacer, 9 Agamben formulates this logic as 'the anthropological machine.' 10 This mechanism generates figures of the human by dividing or cutting between human and animal. Yet at each moment, the anthropological machine teeters on the verge of breakdown. 'The motor of the historical becoming of the human' (80) has repeatedly produced humanity in tension with animality.
How does the anthropological machine produce any historical becoming of human? Like the machinery of Kafka's Penal Colony, the machine that Agamben describes performs a series of topological operations on the living. It cuts living elements apart (for instance, body and soul) and folds this cut back into the living in order to produce the human. It divides animality off from In as much as the production of the human by the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman is in play in it, the machine functions necessarily by an exclusion (which is also and always already a capture) and an inclusion (which is always and already an exclusion). It is precisely because the human is, in effect, each time already presupposed, that the machine produces in reality a kind of state of exception, a zone of indetermination where the outside is only the exclusion of the inside and the inside, in its turn, only an exclusion of the outside (37). Biological life, which is the secularized form of [bare] life and which shares its unutterability and impenetrability, thus constitutes the real forms of life literally as forms of survival: biological life remains inviolate in such forms as that obscure threat that can suddenly actualize itself in violence, in extraneity, in illnesses, in accidents.
As in

12
[t]here is no convincing reason a comprehensive account of self in society couldn't be built by a consilient chain: neuroscientists explain how the brain's underlying electrochemical networks functions; evolutionary psychologists explain how and why those networks create channels of "prepared learning" or instinct; ... political theorists and moral leaders explore the best ways to structure society to reconcile those patterns of group behaviour with individual needs. (214) At the base of the envisaged 'comprehensive account of self in society' lies neurochemistry and just above, evolutionary accounts of 'prepared learning. Once again, a lack of discrimination has a potentially adaptive value. In life-or-death situations, you never know where relevant information might lie. ... This, too, is a kind of thinking. (59) This 'thinking' is not linguistic, logical, rational, conscious or even unconscious.
Many of the examples of rapid fearful cognition come from law enforcement On the other hand, the transformation of bare life into political form is not unique to democracy.
Agamben claims directly that democracy and totalitarianism converge at a 'historico-philosophical level.' 16 Both know 'no value ... other than life itself' 14 (10) . Furthermore, he insists that only by holding on to the idea of their 'inner solidarity' can 'new realities and unforeseen convergences' be sensed and understood. Hence while the animalized accounts of thinking vindicate and liberate bare life, they also transform zoě into a way or form of life. In doing so, they affirm no value other than life itself.
Techniques of transforming zoě
How do the animalising accounts transform zoě? Practically, they begin by naming. Johnson suggests learning to name chemicals and brain regions:
If you spend some time exploring this new world, you will end up with a set of conceptual building blocks to use when thinking about how your brain works: some of them specific chemicals, some them localized regions, some of them broader patterns of interaction between regions or chemicals. (184) Naming never simply denominates. As Judith Butler argues, 'to be named by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all.' 17 Naming substantiates, organizes, distributes and lays the ground for regulation, in this case of a sense of self oriented by biological and behavioural knowledges. For instance, Gladwell has the reader imagine going into a psychologist's office to take a language test: make four-word sentences out of some five-word sets. The sets include words like 'worried,' 'old', 'Florida', 'lonely'. After setting ten word samples for the reader to test themselves, Gladwell remarks 'After you finished that test -believe it or not-you would have walked out of my office and back down the hall more slowly than you walked in. With that test, I affected the way you behaved. ... You thought that I was just making you take a language test. But, in fact, what I was also doing was making the big computer in your brain -your adaptive unconscious -think about the state of being old' (53).
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The imagined experiment sets a scene. In this scene, things take place on a largely inaccessible level (that Gladwell somewhat problematically terms 'the big computer in your brain'). According to Gladwell, the language test and its aftermath -walking more slowly -show that the 'adaptive unconscious' 'picked up some clues that we're in an environment that is really concerned about old age' (58). In trying to transform bare life into way of life, the test brings to light the penumbra of instantaneous impressions and conclusions that accompany an explicit cognitive task.
Yet visiting a psychologist's office to take such a test is not a neutral situation.
Test situations generate anxieties. The disciplinary norms and techniques of the psy-disciplines institute and structure the event. The imagined test in the book embeds language-thought within modes of address, compliance, norms and performance. Taking this test, even in the literary form offered by a book on popular science, places the experience in a specific register. As Nikolas Rose puts it, The colloquial designations, the simple examples, the dissection of recognizable moves: all these provide a means of rendering our own experiences in social transactions into thought and making amenable them to management. 18 The features that Gladwell's imagined test seeks to bring to light, and to render recognisable for readers, relies on a pre-existing familiarity. Psychological testing interpellates subjects and correlates them norms in educational, employment, medical, therapeutic or pastoral settings. Because subjects are accustomed to being tested, they quickly recognise the structures and forces framing their responses. The test results -walking down the hallway more The tight coupling between territory and behaviour figures in the contemporary literature on animalisations of thinking. These accounts (and again Johnson's book is exemplary) take two things from it. Firstly, they re-iterate the connection between milieu and action-reaction. Secondly, they treat this connection as something to be experienced and acted on. People can become more sensitive to or conscious of the connection between trigger and reaction.
The territories and behaviours of everydayness
They can also perhaps modify the connection. Fear, as mentioned above, and love-attachment, commonly appear as the most important sites of intervention examined in these accounts. Johnson's book describes a life-threatening event that happened to the author and his partner in their Manhattan apartment. In his story of the shattering of a large window during a storm, Johnson contends that fear, and his memory of that response link certain marks (the sound of wind) to reactions: This is the body's fear response, an orchestral mix of physiological instruments launching with masterful speed and precision. ... Feeling it kick in is one of the best ways to experience your brain and body as an autonomous system, operating independently of your conscious will. (49) The sound of wind triggers bodily changes -tensing of muscles, sweating, shivering, eye movements, etc. In Johnson's case, the whistling of wind around a building launches 'an orchestral mix of physiological instruments.' 19 Importantly, this trigger has also become a way for him to experience his own 'brain and body as an autonomous system.' Similarly, for Connolly, fear reactions offer a particularly quotidian site for the modification of thinking:
In this instance the relatively slow, complex process of perception gives way to the lightning-fast, crude processing of the amygdala. ... Let's call the emergency percept infra-perception, because of its speed and its processing of information without visual imagery. It happens all the time, as when you turn your car in a flash on the road or freeze suddenly while walking in the woods. For most people, I suspect, the neuroscience of personal connection will have more intimate revelations as we come to understand and recognize the chemicals that trigger these powerful feelings. Not just because it's intellectually interesting to know that your feelings of attachment are partially instigated by oxytocin, but also because the chemistry's effects go beyond the primary emotion itself-altering your memory, your immediate attention, your evaluation of people and environments. (130) The 'intimate revelations' in his account tell of his partner nursing her newborn Heidegger's reading of the existentially profound state of boredom cannot ever be fully distinguished from the dazed state of animality. Conceptually and ontologically, boredom actually coalesces with the state of being dazed (65). As Agamben concludes, 'Dasein is simply an animal who has learnt to be bored, who has been woken from its own dazedness and to its own dazedness' (70).
The 'practical mystery' of the separation between animal and human lives does not rest on any essential difference such as language, rationality, capacity for invention etc. it lies in a zone of half-awake indetermination, between being dazed and being bored. The 'banal, quotidian mysticism' he affirms comes from being-dazed. Effectively, Agamben, via Heidegger, folds the line between animal and human within the human in a way that emphasizes its mutability.
'We' share with and veer away animals this dazed relation or absorption in the world.
Waking and thinking as form-of-life
I suggested earlier that in the texts under discussion, thinking has a privileged status. If often seems that we must preserve thinking itself as part of human selfhood at all costs. Yet if the technologies of animalized self have any purchses, thinking cannot remain what it was. It works beneath 'direct reflective regulation' as Connolly puts it. At this point, two scenarios are possible from Heidegger's perspective: (a) posthistorical man no longer preserves his own animality as undisclosable, but rather seeks to take it on and govern it by means of technology; (b) man, the shepherd or being, appropriates his own concealedness, his own animality, which neither remains hidden nor is made an object of mastery, but is thought as such, as pure abandonment. This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoě. Here attention will also have to be given to the analogies between politics and the epochal situation of metaphysics. (188) Why this injunction? Why would anyone especially want a 'form of life' that is 'exhausted in bare life', especially given that bare life is the included-other that 25 has become the principle on which biopolitical sovereignty pivots? Why must the analogies between politics and the 'epochal situation of metaphysics' receive attention?
Agamben envisages the emergence of a field of research on the fringes of the biopolitical terrain occupied by politics, philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence. This fringe would not cut bare life into form and matter, into bios and zoě. Here, however, thought or thinking is crucial here because life and 'form-of-life ' coincide in it. By contrast, the animalizing accounts attempt to identify the forms of thought that imbue life and subject them to regulation.
In an essay entitled 'Form-of-life', Agamben asserts:
Thought is form-of-life, life that cannot be separated from its form; and anywhere the intimacy of this inseparable life appears, in the materiality of corporeal processes and habitual ways of life no less than in theory, there and only there is there thought. with its own zoě. In the language of his earlier work, 'the contingent is not simply the non-necessary, that which can not-be, but that which, being the thus, being only its mode of being, is capable of the rather, can not not-be '. 24 This zone where something becomes 'its mode of being' cannot be thought except as thought thinking itself. By virtue of its own singularity or 'thusness', thinking can never become an object or a subject. In this respect, it diverges in principle at least from the techniques advocated by Connolly, Gladwell and 
Conclusion
Can we accept animality as the basis of thinking? 'Our' animality cannot be thought because thinking itself is put in question by animality. Thinking as 'form-of-life' cannot get very far away from management of animality. Almost the only distance it can give itself comes from that fact that it does not frame scientific thinking in the way that the popular and some academic accounts do.
As biomedical sciences and capitalism become increasingly entwined, we can expect further intimate experimental syntheses of life and power to appear.
The need for ways of sensing and making sense of 'our' animality or 'our biological nature' grows. It is important not to treat these animalising experiments in thought solely as objects of criticism. Because they are quotidian, everyday forms of separation, they make it possible to begin to see what is stake in the entwining of biomedical and political life. Like Agamben's readings of Heidegger, in which the structural coupling between perception, movement and milieu also pushes conceptions of what it is to have a world to their limit, the animalisation of thought, in its attempts structurally couple self-awareness and biomedical knowledge, shows why it is hard to make animality present as such. (In the discussion above, the proximity between absorption-abandonment and boredom-wakefulness that Agamben finds in Heidegger was key to this argument.) Why can't we just accept our own animality? 'Our' animality cannot be thought as such because thought itself is put in question by animality.
Thinking as 'form-of-life' (the connective hyphens are important), something that Agamben valorises strongly, is not very far away from management of animality. Almost the only difference is that it does not keep scientific thinking outside the frame in the way that the popular and some academic accounts do. 
